While concentration measures are a good indicator of market structure, the link with competitiveness is more complex than often assumed. In particular, the modern with the impact of the Smith Report on audit committees will serve to reduce these ratios. Another finding is that audit firms with expertise in a particular sector appeared to earn significantly higher non-audit fees from their audit clients in that sector. The paper thus provides a solid empirical basis for debate. The subsequent discussion considers the implications for companies and audit firms of the high level of concentration in the current regulatory climate, where no direct regulatory intervention is planned.
INTRODUCTION
The last fifteen years have seen the emergence of a dominant Big Eight in the audit market and the subsequent reduction of this group, through merger and firm collapse, to a Big Four. The UK government's basic position is that competitive markets, characterised by many competitors and low barriers to entry, are the main drivers of productivity, efficiency, product development, accurate pricing and choice for the consumer. The competitive process, which may be characterised by concentration, barriers to entry and collusion, is influenced by supply and demand factors, such as costs, incentives, switching costs and information. This process, in turn, influences the nature of market outcomes, such as price and choice. In competition assessment, market share is used as an indicator of the existing level of competition in a market. 4 Many academic studies of auditor concentration explicitly offer as motivation the link between market concentration and excessive market power. 5 It must be said that concerns about the anti-competitive implications of rising levels of concentration are not new. There has always been a widespread belief that rising concentration leads to anti-competitive behaviour, encouraging tacit or explicit cartellike agreements among the major providers. Yet, paradoxically, during the early 1990s there were concerns that the large firms were competing too aggressively. 6 It was widely believed that excessive price competition resulted in 'low-balling' behaviour and cross-subsidisation against non-audit services. In addition, companies perceived a willingness on the part of audit firms to offer different accounting interpretations and this encouraged 'opinion-shopping' behaviour by companies.
Although no clear evidence exists to support these beliefs and perceptions, ethical guidance on both matters was issued by the Chartered Accountants Joint Ethics Committee. 7 It is, therefore, ironic that the two mega-mergers that produced the Big Six in 1989 were a market response to intense competitive pressures.
The most recent reduction in the dominant group, however, arose because of the accounting and auditing scandal associated with Enron. Their auditors, Andersens, suffered reputation loss on such a scale that the firm was unable to continue. 8 This event introduced a shock to the system, destabilising the prevailing market 'equilibrium'. It is argued by some that a consequence of this and other recent accounting scandals has been a marked reduction in audit fee pressures. Companies are no longer pressing for low fees, recognising the need for high quality audit to restore confidence in audited accounts. 9 After a long period of stagnation and even decline in the level of real audit fees in the UK, the US and elsewhere, a widespread step change in audit fees appears to be occurring, at least in the US. The situation in the UK is less clear, as the incidence of audit tendering is increasing and there are no regulatory driven requirements for additional work in relation to corporate governance.
Unfortunately, the debate surrounding these issues is largely based on untested assumptions and anecdotal evidence. The purpose of the present paper is to provide a more solid empirical foundation for the debate. It first reviews the available literature regarding the causes and consequences of audit market concentration, drawing, in particular, upon the modern theory of industrial organisation. Second, it provides systematic empirical evidence on the extent and nature of concentration in the UK listed company audit market. In particular, the recent trend in concentration and its level as at April 2002 are reported; this is then disaggregated by firm, by market segment and by FTSE industry sector. The association between non-audit fees paid to the auditor and audit fees is also analysed by firm, market segment and industry sector. The subsequent discussion considers how the market itself may adjust to this high level of concentration in the absence of direct regulatory action.
PRIOR LITERATURE

Industrial organisation theory
It is unfortunate that few studies point out the significance of recent developments in industrial organisation theory to studies of audit market concentration and competition.
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Traditional industrial economics holds that market structure (i.e. the numbers of competing firms and their market shares) is a causal determinant of market conduct (i.e. the extent and nature of price and non-price competition).
Market conduct, in turn, determines economic performance, in particular, whether or not excess profits are earned through oligopolistic collusion or the exercise of monopoly power. It is belief in this structure-conduct-performance paradigm, in Bain's (1956) traditional formulation, which explains the concerns about rising levels of audit market concentration. 12 Figure 1, panel A shows these simple linkages. A great deal of merger analysis is still based on the analysis of market structure and concentration ratios, perhaps because they are relatively easy to measure. 13 In recent years, however, industrial economists have moved away from claiming that a strict causal relationship exists between concentration and competition. It is argued instead that, in equilibrium, both concentration and performance are jointly determined by underlying cost and demand parameters ( Figure 1, panel B ).
14 Under this view, the detrimental effects of rising concentration are less clear-cut. 15 Moreover, the 'new industrial organisation' economics has brought strategic issues to the fore, emphasising the importance of barriers to entry and strategic interactions. 16 [ Figure 1 about here] The modern industrial organisation literature classifies markets into six broad types.
Three market types are characterised by high market power and generally ineffective competition: monopoly (one firm has 100%); dominant firm (one firm has 40% to 99%); and tight oligopoly (four firms have over 60%). The other three market types exhibit effective competition: loose oligopoly (four firms have less than 40%), monopolistic competition (many competitors each with a slight degree of market power) and pure competition (many competitors, none of whom has market power). 17 
Level of concentration in the audit market
For the audit market, concentration is measured using a variety of metrics, including number of clients, audit fees, and (since audit fees are not publicly disclosed in many countries) surrogates for audit fees such as client revenues or total assets. 18 Concentration ratios, which report the share of a given number of the largest suppliers, are most commonly reported. Comparisons over time and across countries are, however, often difficult due to the different metrics used and the different submarkets analysed.
In virtually all studies, the level of concentration has been shown to be rising over time. In the UK, the four-firm concentration ratio (based on number of audits) for all domestic listed companies (including the USM/AIM) was reported as 43% in 1987, 59% in 1991 and 60% in 1995. 19 
Causes of change in concentration
Changes in market concentration occur for three main reasons: voluntary realignments; changes in the set of consumers; and changes in the set of suppliers. 20 Companies are free to change their auditor, and realignments do take place for a variety of reasons. The six most common reasons given by UK listed companies who changed during the early 1990s were: high audit fee; dissatisfaction with audit quality, in terms of the auditor's ability to detect problems; changes in company's top management; need for group auditor rationalisation; need for a Big Six firm; and merger/takeover by/with another company. 21 If, however, there is an underlying preference for the leading suppliers, then these realignments will, ceteris paribus, gradually result in rising concentration. New listings, insolvencies and mergers also play a role, although the overall direction of impact is unpredictable.
Major increases in concentration can occur when leading suppliers disappear from the market, either through merger or demise. It should be noted, however, that this is not necessarily the case. 22 Various US studies have, however, predicted ex ante or documented ex post an increase in concentration following the Big Eight mergers. 23 It has also been reported that the Big Eight mega-mergers extended the dominance of the large firms across ten countries, particularly in the European market. 24 
Consequences of increasing concentration
A key issue for debate is the extent to which the mega-mergers of recent times have resulted in an increase in market power (reflected in fee levels and audit firm profitability), an increase in efficiency, or a combination of the two effects? In other words, what is the effect on competition? Horizontal mergers tend to increase industry concentration in the face of high barriers to entry and clients' reluctance to change supplier. 25 This can lead to higher prices. Alternatively, costs may be reduced due to economies of scale and scope, the strategic use of complementary resources, etc. Unfortunately, these are extremely difficult issues to address in a rigorous and comprehensive manner and research in this area is difficult. As one leading industrial economist put it, 'After more than a century of study, [tight oligopoly] continues to baffle and fascinate economists. When a market contains only a few rivals, their behavior, prices, profits, and innovation are difficult to predict.' 26 Several studies examine audit fee trends post-merger. In the UK, there was no significant increase in audit fees post the 1989 mega-mergers, which might be interpreted as a neutral effect on competition. 27 This outcome may, however, have been confounded by over-capacity in the market. One study that set out to explicitly examine the effect of accounting firm mergers on competition in the market for accounting services examined audit firm performance, based on revenue per employee, pre-and post-mergers. 28 It was found that the performance of large firms did not differ significantly from that of small firms in several countries, suggesting that high levels of concentration do not necessarily mean low levels of competition.
Other studies have also concluded that the Big Eight mega-mergers 'may have had little, if any, impact on competition'. 29 Another study of the 1989 mega-mergers in the US found that the post-merger period was characterised by a slight decline in market share for the merged firms compared to their close rivals, a decline in audit price for both groups, and a decrease in factor costs for the merged firms relative to their close rivals. This suggests that these mergers resulted in increased efficiencies that were passed through to end users in the form of lower prices. 30 (It is possible that these efficiencies within the audit market arose due to over-capacity. It is, however, also possible that they were offset by market power influences in non-audit services (NAS).)
Another potentially important consequence of increasing concentration is on the range of supplier choice available. 31 One of the obvious effects of the reduction in the number of top tier audit firms is the reduced choice available. It is known that some companies have a distinct preference for an auditor who is not associated with their competitors. This becomes particularly problematic in concentrated industries where this preference is greater. 32 
Audit market segmentation and industry specialisation
The market for audit services is recognised to be segmented into distinct sub-markets in a hierarchical way. At the national level, one can distinguish the private (for profit) and public (not-for-profit) sectors, with the former split into listed and unlisted companies. The listed company market can be further split based on (i) stock market indices (e.g. FTSE 100, FTSE 250, Small, Fledgling) and (ii) industry sector. 33 Whether certain types of audit firm seek to specialise in specific stock market sectors is largely unknown (although there is casual evidence to indicate that the top tier firms attach great importance to the reputation-enhancing aspects of auditing a FTSE 100 company). It is, however, widely recognised that the large firms are all specialising in particular industries (product lines) to a degree. They are making huge capital investments in people with industry-specific knowledge and in knowledge management systems to establish the key performance indicators for that industry. 34 Another driver of industry specialism is mergers and acquisitions activity in a sector, since the auditors of the acquirer tend to get the audit of the combined group. US studies have found that concentration levels are highest in regulated industries, in more concentrated industries and in industries experiencing rapid growth, but lower in industries with a high risk of litigation. They have also found that industry market leaders gain market share relative to non-leaders, suggesting that there are returns to investing in specialisation. 35 
METHODS
The database used for the present study covers all companies listed on the London stock exchange (main market and AIM) and their auditors as at April 2002.
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The total number of 2,180 companies includes 545 AIM companies and 459 investment trusts. Joint audits were allocated equally to the audit firms concerned.
Market shares are reported using number of audits and audit fees as the activity measures. Since audit fee data was missing for many investment trusts, this sector is excluded from some analyses. While the two measures are very highly correlated, it is known that measures based on the number of clients fall below fee-based measures, due to the 'size effect', whereby large clients tend to employ large audit firms. 37 Concentration ratios and the number of active firms are also reported.
RESULTS
Current level and historical trend in UK concentration
Auditor concentration in the UK domestic listed company market has been documented for at least 35 years. Figure 2 shows the trend in the four-and eight-firm concentration ratios (CR4 and CR8) based on number of audits over this period. A rapid and accelerating increase is apparent. By 2002, immediately prior to the Andersen collapse, CR4 is 66.6% (including AIM companies and investment trusts) and CR8 is 85.9%. [ Figure 2 about here] Population data based on audit fees is available for only a relatively short recent period. It has been reported elsewhere that CR4 excluding investment trusts was 79.4% in 1995. 39 The present study shows the corresponding ratio to be 89.6% in 2002, with a pro forma of 96.3% in 2003. 40 The exclusion of the AIM companies is unlikely to have a significant impact on these measures, given the relatively low level of audit fees in this sub-market. 41 Another useful supply-side indicator is the number of firms active in a particular market sector. The dramatic decline is shown in the panel at the foot of Figure 2 . In the last twelve years, the number of firms doing audits of domestic listed UK companies has almost halved, dropping from 166 to just 84.
A more detailed analysis of market shares by individual firm, on the basis of both number of audits and audit fees, is shown in Table 1 . This table excludes AIM companies and investment trusts. Several observations can be made from this table.
First, the step change in market share between the 'Big Boys' and the rest is now vast.
On the basis of audit fees earned, the smallest of the four remaining Big Boys now has 15.6% of the market (Deloitte & Touche and Andersens combined market share is 19.2%), whereas the closest rival is Binder Hamlyn with a mere 1.0%. Second, the firm with the largest market share, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), now has 36.9% of the fees in the market. The audit market, commonly characterised as a tight oligopoly, seems to be heading towards what the industrial organisation theorists refer to as a 'dominant firm' market type, with 40% as the suggested cut-off level. It must be emphasised, however, that the presence of high market share is no longer believed by industrial economists to necessarily lead to anti-competitive behaviour.
[ Table 1 about here]
Comparison with the US market
It is interesting to compare UK concentration levels with those in the US. A recent study covering the three main US exchanges (NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ) shows CR4 based on number of audits to have been 70.4% in 1999, possibly just ahead of the corresponding level in the UK at that time. 42 
Concentration by market segment
An analysis of market shares by market segment, on the basis of audit fees, is shown in Table 2 . Each of the main players' shares is also given. A clear pattern emerges of lessening, but still high, concentration levels outside the premier FTSE indices. This pattern is predictable given the 'size effect' discussed above, whereby large companies are associated with large audit firms. It can be noted that in the FTSE 100 sub-market, PwC's market share exceeds the 40% threshold (measured in terms of both number of audits and audit fees).
[ Table 2 about here]
Concentration by industry sector
The main market population of 1,635 companies (i.e. including investment trusts but excluding AIM companies) was classified into 38 industry sectors using the two digit sectors from the FTSE Actuaries Industry Classification System and an analysis of market shares by sector, on the basis of audit fees, is shown in Table 3 . The number of companies in a sector varies widely from just three (tobacco) to 322 (investment companies) (see column 2 of Table 3 ).
[ Table 3 about here]
The Big Five hold 100% share of six sectors and PwC audits all three tobacco companies. Specific firms hold market share of 70% up to 100% as follows: E&Y in two sectors (oil and gas; and forestry and paper), KPMG in diversified industrials; and PwC in six sectors (steel and other metals; automobiles; tobacco; gas distribution; water; and insurance). Neither Deloitte & Touche nor Andersens (nor even the combined firm) achieves this market share in any sector.
Market shares of 50% up to 70% are held by Ernst & Young in one sector (investment companies), KPMG in three sectors (aerospace and defence; beverages; and banks) and PwC in seven sectors (food producers and processors, personal care and household products; pharmaceuticals; distributors; general retailers; food and drug retailers; and electricity). Deloitte & Touche/Andersens combined firm achieves this level of market share in one sector (information technology hardware). Thus, most regulated industries are highly concentrated, consistent with evidence in the US. 43 Below this level of market share, there are many sectors where specialists exist, since a market share of only 15% is often taken to indicate specialism. 44 
Associated non-audit service provision
One of the major debates to have emerged from the Enron scandal concerns the provision of non-audit services to audit clients, and the effect that this might have (or be seen to have) on auditor independence. 45 It is, therefore, of interest to compare the ratio of non-audit fees (paid to incumbent auditor) to audit fees for different audit firms and across different market segments and sectors.
[ Table 4 Finally, Panel C shows the variation in fee ratio within industry sectors. Ratios exceed 500% for three sectors (food and drug retailers; electricity; and life assurance).
Ratios lie between 300% and 500% for four sectors (beverages; pharmaceuticals; telecommunication services; and gas distribution). It might be speculated that audit firms with expertise in a particular industry sector (large audit market share) would be more likely to earn higher NAS fees relative to audit fees from audit clients. Given that these firms are likely to have deeper knowledge in these sectors, it is to be expected that they would be among the preferred suppliers. To investigate this, a simple correlation (Pearson coefficient) between fee ratio and sector market share was calculated based on the pooled sample of 234 audit firm-sector observations (i.e. 6 audit firms × 38 sectors). The correlation coefficient was found to be positive and highly significant (r = 0.41; p = 0.0001) suggesting that increased sector audit market share is associated with a multiplier effect between audit fees and NAS fees from audit clients.
It is likely, however, that recent disposals by firms of their management consultancy and outsource firms, combined with the impact of the Smith Report on audit committees, will serve to reduce these ratios. 46 The Smith report requires the audit committee 'to develop and implement policy on the engagement of the external auditor to supply non-audit services'.
Discussion
The results presented above provide a comprehensive view of concentration in the UK domestic listed company audit market as at April 2002.
The extant literature provides very little evidence to justify concerns about a lack of competitiveness resulting from high levels of concentration in the market. However, in the post-Enron environment, there is emerging evidence that, in the US at least, the intense pressure on audit fees has lifted and fees are increasing substantially. By contrast, the amount of NAS purchased from auditors is suggested to be in rapid decline in both the US and the UK. 47 Although partly due to independence concerns, this may also be partly due to the recent disposals by the large firms of their consultancy arms. These changes have the potential to alter the complex dynamic between concentration and competition in an unpredictable way. Forms of competitive behaviour (both price and non-price) may change.
However, what is certainly true is that the reduction in the number of active audit firms in the market, and especially in the number of top tier firms (now four), does reduce consumer choice and increases the likelihood of conflicts of interest.
Companies may find it increasingly difficult (if not impossible) to identify a top tier firm that neither audits nor provides other sensitive services to a major competitor.
We would argue that, even in the absence of evidence that increasing concentration has undermined competition in the past, the observed current levels of concentration are a legitimate concern. Changing environmental factors mean that past evidence is no longer relevant to the current situation, and reduced choice and conflicts of interest may be growing.
So how could this rise in concentration be halted or reversed? Both demand-and supply-side parameters would need to change. On the demand-side, the pressures to have a top tier auditor are known to be intense. 48 These pressures arise from real or perceived internal needs and from third parties (major shareholders, lenders, bankers and regulators). Until or unless the next tier (the so-called Group A firms) show that they are able, at their current organisation size, to undertake more listed company audits, they will generally not be acceptable suppliers. They may, however, pick up work which the Big Four cannot undertake because of conflicts of interests.
On the supply-side, one possibility is for some of these Group A firms to merge to form a firm that is more comparable in scale to those in the top tier or be a niche supplier of specialist services. A clear problem is the huge chasm of scale (and possibly scope) that separates the top tier firms from the Group A firms. A second possibility is for the existing top tier firms to demerge or otherwise split into smaller organisational units (whether voluntarily or through regulatory intervention). Audits are to some extent divisible, even although joints audits are becoming something of a rarity.
However, it is debatable whether any of these demand-and supply-side changes are possible in practical terms, given the truly global nature of the market and the high barriers to entry. Regulators could, of course, introduce rotation or heavily restrict NAS, but they do not currently appear inclined to do so as a concentration intervention strategy.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study provides a detailed analysis of the extent of concentration in the UK listed company market immediately prior to Andersens' demise and, on a pro forma basis, the situation in 2003 where only four main players remain. The remaining four firms hold 96% of the market (based on audit fees), with a single firm (PwC) holding 37% of the market. Levels of concentration are significantly higher in the premier market segments and certain industry sectors. The multiplier effect between audit fees and NAS fees from audit clients is greatest among FTSE 100 companies and certain industry sectors, while a large sector market share appears to increase the magnitude of this association.
The impact of such high levels of concentration on competition (i.e. the degree of market power and efficiency levels) is difficult to predict, although there is little evidence to suggest that previous increases in concentration have reduced competitiveness in the market. However, the environmental context is changing dramatically -NAS provision to audit clients is falling and this may significantly affect the dynamic between concentration and competition. Moreover, the reduced purchaser choice, exacerbated by conflicts of interest and high barriers to entry to the global market, is problematic. 
